After offering an overview of some of the main themes of Popper’s political thought, the paper argues that his account faces two PROBLEMS relating to institutions. The first is that while Popper stresses the ‘RATIONAL unity of mankind’, and the potential for any of us to furnish criticisms of public policy, it is not clear what institutional means currently exist for this to enable this to take place. Second, Popper has stressed the conjectural character of even our best theories. However, at any point, some theories will have fared better in the face of criticism than others, and they may give us important information about constraints on our actions. At the same time, as ordinary citizens we may not be in a good position to understand the theories in question, let alone appraise the state of the specialised discussion of them. There is, it is suggested, a case for thinking of ways to institutionally entrench such fallible theories, especially in the current setting in which social media play an important role

Our analysis of Popper’s philosophy of science focuses on his concepts of tradition and situational analysis. These concepts represent innovative Popperian contributions to a historical and hermeneutical turn in philosophy of science that most of his critics, especially Kuhn, fail to recognize. According to his historical view, Popper conceives sciences as a complex of traditions in continuous transformation and progress by means of RATIONAL discussion of theories. In order to grasp the RATIONAL progress of scientific traditions, Popper proposes an original method that he calls “situational analysis”. This hermeneutical method seeks to understand the concepts, hypotheses, actions, practices, controversies and products that scientists made to solve PROBLEMS in their specific historical contexts to improve the truth content of theories. In addition to his historical and hermeneutical turn, Popper also inquired about the social and political conditions for the progress of scientific traditions by means of intersubjective criticism of theories and conjectures. According to him, the RATIONAL discussion of ideas requires, as necessary conditions, plurality of ideas, intellectual humility, and freedom of thought and communication that can only exist in an open and democratic society. With these considerations, we may say that in addition to a historical and hermeneutical turn, Popper also contributed to a social and political turn in the philosophy of science

We are... So, to reframe the inquiry: who are we on a metaphysical level? Which aspects of ourselves are the most universally representative of who we are? How do we fare in the face of the passage of time? For decades, philosophers have debated the concept of diachronic personal identity, which focuses on the question of what keeps us alive. An intricate debate has developed between those who hold the body view (animalism) and those who hold the psychological view (memory) on the question of who we are. The two groups will eventually become so firmly set in their views that they will be unable to compromise. Hylomorphic animalism, or the view that humans are RATIONAL animals, living bodies made of prime matter and a RATIONAL soul, is an alternative answer to this divisive question that I propose in this study, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and Aquinas. We only survive if matter and RATIONAL souls do.

One of the most interesting topics in Islamic and Western Philosophy is to determine the boundaries and limits of reason in knowing the real world. Following the existential limits of reason in knowing the reality, we come to its limits in announcing and asserting the facts. In this article, by appealing to the authorized criterions, I try to show both the cognitive and the assertive limits of reason and, thus, to determine the realm of necessary silence of reason about the objects of the world. However, the realm and object of necessary silence of reason is attainable to RATIONAL speech in a specific way. The structure of the reason and the special character of the objects allow that RATIONAL speech and RATIONAL silence come together without causing contradiction.

The influential physicist Richard Feynman became interested in the relationship between religion and science during a mid-career phase. He proposed that their interface was embroiled in unresolvable difficulties. He felt that science demanded an attitude of uncertainty for its claims, while religion contrarily required certain belief in its core doctrines. Though possessing several non-contradictory dimensions, Feynman felt that the nature of the truth claims of science and religion suffered from insurmountable elemental conflicts. This was by contrast to Karl Popper, the leading critical RATIONAList of the 20th century, who argued that there could be no tension between science and religion. This paper will argue that the ‘Feynman Problem’ is not as insoluble as it appears. Rather, several solutions exist within critical RATIONALism. Two will be presented-the first revolves around the conjectural basis of knowledge and is already a well characterised critical RATIONAList notion. The second is a novel solution based on the separate categorisation of psychological, pragmatic, and epistemological attitudes to religion and science. Karl Popper’s view of religion-science dissimilarity was a minimalist point of departure for critical RATIONALists, who have developed increasingly sophisticated frameworks for investigating the relationship between faith and reason. Critical RATIONALism represents an equally inspiRATIONAL methodology for the pursuit of scientific and religious truth. Though both Feynman and Popper’s views on religion were underdeveloped, they foreshadowed the religion-science frameworks advocated by many late 20th century scientists, especially in the form of New Atheism and Gould’s NOMA theory.

There are different views among the Muslim scholars on the authority of consensus in doctrinal issues: All Asha’irites accept the validity of consensus in doctrinal matters, although some of them believe in some limitations in this matter. Mu’tazelites, except for Nazzam, believe that consensus is a prove in the doctrinal issues and it can be referred to in such matters but Nazza does not give any value to consensus, not in the rules of law nor in doctrinal issues. Maturidites believe in the validity of consensus on the condition that it is supported by the Qur’an and the Islamic traditions; so according to them the consensus which is not supported by the two mentioned sources, not only in not valid but is a cause of the deviation of the community. There are some groups among Imamites- like Akhbarites- who do not believe in the validity of consensus, not in jurisprudential laws nor in theological issues. But the scholars of the principles of jurisprudence believe in the validity of the consensus that reveals the verdict of the infallible Imam. Two general views can be obtained from their words. First: the majority of the ancient and resent scholars believe in the validity of consensus both in jurisprudential laws and all doctrinal issues unless in the matters that the authority of consensus itself is based on them, like the existence of God or the prophethood. second: majority of the scholars of the recent countries – particularly fallowing the time of Sheikh al-Ansari, Have believed in the validity of consensus only in the jurisprudential laws and in other than these, they do not believe that it is a revealer of the verdict of the infallible because they believe that it is just the task of the Imam and his duty to express the jurisprudential laws and religious verdicts.

The focus of this study is primarily on “the discrepancy in mentality as an important factor affecting family PROBLEMS and divorce”. For this purpose, some minor studies were conducted each of which experimentally examined different aspects of mental discrepancy in Iranian families. Almost all of these studies showed that permanent disputes and divorces resulted from the differences in their world-views, thinkings, and impressions in their mutual affairs. At last, the theory of Homogamy with two major revisions were used to explain the reasons and causes of family PROBLEMS and divorce which were confirmed in minor studies and cases.

In this paper, we study the structure of finite Frobenius groups whose non-RATIONAL or non-real irreducible characters are linear.

There has always been a serious ques tion among researchers and politicians on whatthe progress is and what its components are. Various research works have been carriedout for finding logical answers to the above ques tions, each picturing an ideal society andprogress in some way. "Clean life" is perhaps the mos t important picture that has beencreated as inspired by the Holy Quran. This picture, too, is so general that practicallyleaves no image before the researchers and proponents of progress. This paper intendsto find a proper answer to the ques tion of progress in view of Allameh MohammadTaqi Ja’ fari through a descriptive and analytical method. Results of the s tudy indicatethat Ja’ fari’ s "RATIONAL life" to the s trength of a theory is the bes t answer to the ques tionof progress, thanks to its intentional and extensional relations with clean life and idealsociety. RATIONAL life gives us both logic of social order leading to progress and properinteraction for realizing this goal. RATIONAL life is a theory where religion, philosophy andhuman experience meet, from among them the role of religion in picturing and realizingthe progress is quite outs tanding.